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Available online 24 February 2016AbstractThis paper examines use of financial derivatives (currency, interest rate and commodity) and its effect on firm value of non-financial Turkish
firms for period of 2007e2013. Only 36.41% of companies in our sample use derivatives to hedge their currency, interest rate or commodity
price risks. We have used Tobin's Q ratio analysis with panel data models, Fama-French three-factor time-series analysis and single sector
analysis to investigate whether corporate derivatives use is value relevant or not. Except Tobin's Q ratio analysis with system GMM estimators,
we cannot find significant hedging premium or discount for all Turkish non-financial firms. We find a positive relationship between derivatives
use and firm value, only when we use Tobin's Q ratio analysis with system GMM estimators. We also test the effects of currency hedging, interest
rate hedging and commodity price hedging separately and find similar results as in the case of general derivatives use. Overall, majority of our
results imply that use of financial derivatives does not affect firm value in Turkish market.
Copyright © 2016, Borsa _Istanbul Anonim S¸irketi. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-
ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
JEL classification: G32; D81; M21
Keywords: Risk management; Hedging; Derivatives; Derivatives use; Firm value1. Introduction
In contemporary business environment, risk management
has become one of the most important business drivers,
especially during the recent financial crisis. More companies
have been conducting risk management systems and more
non-financial firms have been using financial derivatives
intensively to manage their financial risks, recently. Hence,
they are able to focus on their main operating activities.
Considering the popularity of risk management activities in
practice, we can argue that risk management practices
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license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).management. Smith and Stulz (1985) started to question this
conflict and theoretically have proven that risk management is
beneficial to firms in presence of market imperfections.
Theoretically proven value-increasing channels of hedging are
tax incentives to hedge, decreased expected costs of financial
distress, decreased underinvestment costs, managerial
compensation and asymmetric information (Dadalt, Gay, &
Nam, 2002; Demarzo & Duffie 1995; Froot, Scharfstein, &
Stein, 1993; Leland, 1998; Ross, 1996; Smith & Stulz, 1985;
Stulz, 1996).
After theoretical studies, researchers have started to
investigate the relationship between derivatives use (a strong
proxy for risk management) and firm value empirically by
collecting data with questionnaires. Next, introduction of
advanced financial reporting standards and disclosure
requirements in the US and EU countries after early 1990s has
encouraged scholars to investigate the value relevance of de-
rivatives use directly by using data reported in financial
statements. So far, empirical studies on risk managementting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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The main reason of this situation is that advanced reporting
requirements have not been applied in most emerging markets.
Consequently, there has been little discussion on value rele-
vance of derivatives use in emerging markets. The main aim of
this study is to investigate effects of risk management activ-
ities (derivatives use) on firm value in non-financial companies
by using an emerging market (Turkey) data set. In this study,
parallel to the classical value relevance of derivatives use
phenomenon, we examine whether financial derivatives use
(currency, interest rate or commodity) is associated with
higher firm value in Turkey. Similar to most emerging mar-
kets, risk management practices of Turkish non-financial firms
are not known well. To our knowledge, this research is the first
detailed investigation to identify levels of derivatives use for
Turkish listed non-financial firms by constructing a unique
hand-collected data set for the period of 2007e2013.
Our first targeted contribution to the literature is that we
present a new detailed evidence on value relevance of hedging
in Turkey (an emerging economy) so that we can compare the
hedging premium/discount level of an emerging economy with
findings of developed economies. Turkish data has certain
unique characteristics in comparison to data sets of developed
countries. Firstly, ownership concentration is very high among
Turkish publicly held firms and investor protection systems are
also relatively weak. As Khediri (2010) explains, existence of
insider blockholders can affect behaviour of investors in such a
way that they might not value hedging policies of Turkish
firms fairly because investors think that insider blockholders
may be risk averse or insiders have other motives to use de-
rivatives rather than risk management and value maximization.
Hence, we expect relatively lower level of hedging premium
(or no hedging premium) in such an environment that investors
are not sure about the real motive of derivative use among
Turkish companies with highly concentrated ownership
structures. Second unique characteristic of Turkish data is
related to the reporting quality of financial derivatives use.
Turkish publicly held companies do not submit a separate
form to capital markets authority and investors for their use of
derivative instruments. Although they conduct International
Financial Reporting Standards, there is no standart application
of IFRS 7 which requires the reporting of financial derivative
use and risks related to these instruments. Because of limited
and nonstandardized information, investors might not be able
to understand crucial details of financial derivative use and not
be able to use related information in their investment de-
cisions. Demarzo and Duffie (1995) and Dadalt et al. (2002)
emphasize that hedging and proper disclosure of hedging ac-
tivities improves informational quality of financial reports and
reduce information asymmetry between managers and out-
siders. Hence, we expect relatively lower level of hedging
premium (or no hedging premium) in such an environment
that managers and owners do not report derivatives use
properly which leads to asymmetric information. By exam-
ining the unique Turkish data, we seek to investigate the ef-
fects of highly concentrated ownership structure and poor
reporting requirements on the value relevance of corporatederivatives use. Because of these two unique characteristics of
Turkish data set, there might be no hedging premium or a
relatively lower level of hedging premium for Turkish non-
financial firms.
Our sample period (7 years) is relatively longer than most
of the studies in this field. Most of the studies generally use a
data set covering only one or two fiscal years because of the
demanding data collection process (For example, Khediri,
2010; Bartram, Brown, & Conrad, 2011; Belghitar, Clark, &
Mefteh, 2013 cover 3 years, 2 years and 4 years respec-
tively). From this aspect, we have a more comprehensive data
set in comparison to other studies.
Another innovation of this study is that we construct a new
derivatives use dummy variable by using quarterly financial
data. In addition to collecting data from annual reports by
searching for derivatives-related words, we collect information
from hedging accounts reported at quarterly financial state-
ments. According to hedging accounting rules in IFRSs, firms
must recognize changes in fair value of derivatives as asset,
liability or equity at each financial reporting period including
interim quarter periods. We construct a dummy variable if a
firm uses one of these derivatives-related accounts reported at
statement of financial position during any of four quarterly
periods. This is an alternative measure of corporate derivative
use. One drawback related to using such a dummy variable is
that we cannot distinguish the type of derivatives use (cur-
rency, interest rate or commodity). However, this data
collection methodology enables us to collect information from
interim reporting periods easily without reading annual reports
and searching for derivatives-related words.
We have used Tobin's Q ratio analysis with panel data
model, Fama-French three-factor time-series analysis and
single sector analysis to investigate whether corporate de-
rivatives use is value relevant or not. Except Tobin's Q ratio
analysis with system GMM estimators, we can not find sig-
nificant hedging premium or discount for Turkish non-
financial firms.
In Section 2, we critically review the related literature on
direct relationship between use of financial derivatives and
firm value. Section 3 describes variables, data set and our
sample that we use in this study. We report and discuss the
results of our study in Section 4. In the last section, we
conclude our study and present some implications.
2. Literature review
Related literature on corporate risk management and value
relevance of derivatives use is very rich and diversified. As
stated by Lookman (2004) scholars generally use two different
approaches to examine empirically the value relevance of
corporate hedging. In the first methodology, determinants of
hedging are tried to be found and these determinants are
generally explanatory variables. These independent variables
are proxies for frictional costs in the financial markets. In
these studies, derivatives use is a dependent variable. For
example, if there is a negative relationship between financial
leverage and derivatives use, this indicates the existence of
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widely used in recent studies, researchers directly investigate
the effects of corporate hedging on firm value. Derivatives use,
a proxy for hedging, is one of explanatory variables and there
are also other control variables in empirical models. In these
models, firm value (measured as Tobin's Q ratio) is dependent
variable. A hedging premium is calculated by using the
regression coefficient of derivatives use variable. We also
preferred this approach in our study.
Berkman and Bradbury (1996) examined the relationship
between extent of hedging and different variables by using
data set of the New Zealand. The study of Berkman and
Bradbury (1996) is important, because they are the first to
mention about calculation of the extent of hedging. The study
of Allayannis and Weston (2001) investigated the effect of
foreign currency hedging on firm value by using a large US
non-financial firms' data set from 1990 to 1995. They found a
statistically and economically significant positive relationship
between derivatives use and firm value by conducting uni-
variate analysis, pooled OLS and fixed-effects panel data
models. They also found that on average, the value of firms
which are exposed to currency risk and use derivatives, is
4.87% higher than non-hedgers. Khediri (2010) investigates
value relevance relationship by using only French data set. He
investigates foreign exchange hedging and interest rate hedg-
ing excluding commodity price risk hedging. He emphasizes
the heteroskedasticity problem for dependent variable (Tobin's
Q) and uses panel data with fixed effects rather than pooled
OLS. He finds no statistically significant relationship between
derivatives use and firm value. He suggests that reasons for
this result are high ownership concentration and weak investor
protection in France. Bartram et al. (2011) present the first
international evidence on value relevance issue. They examine
the effects of derivatives use on firm value and risk by using a
data set of non-financial firms from 47 countries. They find
that there is a positive relationship between derivatives use and
firm value. Recently, Panaretou (2013) investigates the effects
of hedging activities on firm value for the U.K. large non-
financial companies. She finds that the hedging premium is
6% for foreign currency hedging. However, she does not find
any evidence of value relevance for the use of interest rate and
commodity derivative instruments.
Another group of studies investigating the value relevance
of derivatives use focuses on specific industries. Some in-
dustries such as gold mining, airline, oil and gas exploration
are directly exposed to certain risks. Perez-Gonzalez and Yun
(2013) have recently investigated the value relevance of risk
management by using weather derivatives for the first time.
They show that the use of weather derivatives in the U.S.
electric and gas utility firms increases the firm value at
economically and statistically important levels.
Mackay and Moeller (2007) test valuation effects of risk
management by relating revenues and costs to product and
output (energy) prices for 34 U.S. oil refiners during the period
of 1985e2004. They introduce a new measure of hedging by
avoiding the data from financial statement footnotes. They find
that risk management with derivatives can increase firm value.Specifically, they document 2% increase in firm value if the
firm manages risks by hedging concave revenues and leaving
concave costs as exposed. Mackay and Moeller (2007) also
conclude that the market rewards firms that hedge when
hedging creates value and penalizes firms that hedge when
hedging destroys value. In the same vein, Phan, Nguyen, and
Faff (2014) has recently reinvestigated the value relevance of
hedging with financial derivatives for U.S. oil and gas explo-
ration and production companies over the period of
1998e2009. They define two sources of value relevance as the
lower volatility of cash flows and the lower cost of equity.
Phan et al. (2014) argue that hedging is expected to be value
relevant in presence of downside risk which is related to
behaviour of the underlying asset, but hedging might not
enhance firm value when there is no bankruptcy risk and
volatility of underlying assets is on the upside. They use both
cross-sectional and time-series analysis. Their results indicate
that there is significant hedging discount (negative relationship
between hedging and firm value) during the periods charac-
terized with high oil and gas prices, but hedging is value
irrelevant when oil and gas prices decline. Both Mackay and
Moeller (2007) and Phan et al. (2014) emphasize that mar-
ket prices of underlying assets (exchange rate, interest rate and
commodity) which lead to risks in firms' main operations
should be included in empirical methodologies.
The number of studies that examine value relevance of
derivatives use in emerging countries is very limited due to
data limitations. Berrospide, Purnanandam, and Rajan (2008)
study the effect of foreign currency derivatives usage on firm
value in Brazil for the period of 1997e2004. Results of pooled
OLS and fixed effects model regression analyses indicate a
relatively large value premium for hedgers that is 6.7e7.8%
meaning that there is a positive relationship between de-
rivatives use and firm value in Brazil.
Last group of studies in the literature criticizes the existing
papers in terms of measurement of hedging and research
methodology. In their study, Guay and Kothari (2003) argue
that findings of Allayannis and Weston (2001) are not robust
and other risk management tools like operational risk man-
agement techniques that are highly correlated with derivatives
use is the source of hedging premium found. Aretz and
Bartram (2010) give a detailed and critical overview on
theoretical and empirical evidence of the existing literature
related to corporate risk management and its role in value
creation. They conclude that empirical evidence is mixed on
value relevance of derivatives use and it is only a part of the
whole risk management strategy in a firm. They assert that
operational hedging and foreign currency debt are another
important facets of hedging strategies. Jin and Jorion (2006)
emphasize endogeneity problem of the relationship between
derivatives use and market value of firms. Magee (2009) re-
visits the relationship between foreign currency derivative
usage and firm value for the U.S. non-financial firms. Magee
(2009) also emphasizes the endogeneity problem. In exam-
ining the value relevance of derivative usage, Magee (2009)
shows that currency derivative usage variable is not strictly
exogenous. Therefore, he employs a dynamic panel with
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problems. Magee (2009) finds no relationship between deriv-
ative usage and firm value by using dynamic panel data model
with system GMM estimators.
3. Variables, data set and sample
For our investigation of the relationship between de-
rivatives use and firm value, we collected the data from Borsa
Istanbul web site (www.borsaistanbul.com), Public Disclosure
Platform (www.kap.gov.tr) and Datastream financial database.
Our sample captures the period of 2007e2013. The reason
why our sample period begins in 2007 is related to the
effective date of IFRS 7 e Financial Instruments: Disclosures.
IFRS 7 requires companies to disclose information about the
nature and extent of risks arising from use of financial in-
struments so that we are able to detect the derivatives use of a
company by reading its financial reports. In IFRS 7, the risks
related to financial instruments are listed as credit risk,
liquidity risk and market risk. IFRS 7 requires entities to
disclose both qualitative and quantitative knowledge on the
nature and extent of three risks. This knowledge includes fair
value, nominal value, maturity, type and purpose of derivatives
use. Before the introduction of IFRS 7, companies did not
have to report such details in their financial reports.
We examine annual reports and collect the derivatives use
data of 1905 year-firm observations. Our sample consists of
all non-financial Turkish firms that have 7 years non-missing
data during the sample period. There are 1589 year-firm ob-
servations that meet this criteria. Lastly, we also drop the
outliers exceeding 1% and 99% percentiles for Tobin's Q ratio.
Our sample includes the data of total 204 firms that meet
related criteria so that we obtain a balanced panel data of 1428
firm-year observations in total. We do not use any size
threshold to include only large firms. We include all non-
financial firms instead. We exclude financial firms from our
sample because financial firms actively use derivative in-
struments for the purpose of trading or speculation and their
motivation for derivatives use is very different from non-
financial firms. Non-financial firms may also use the deriva-
tive instruments for the purpose of speculation. In our data
collection process, we also check that none of the Turkish
non-financial firms included in our sample uses the derivatives
for speculative purposes.
We accept financial derivatives use as a strong proxy for
hedging and main risk management practice in Turkish non-
financial firms. Turkish non-financial firms may also use
operational hedging and/or natural hedging for risk manage-
ment purposes. However, generally there is no information
about operational hedging in financial reports. In this study,
hedging means the use of financial derivatives. We also
consider three sub-samples of currency, interest rate and
commodity derivatives use to investigate value relevance of
different hedging strategies separately.
Table 1 Panel A provides frequency of derivatives usage
among Turkish non-financial firms by year and by industry. Of
the 1428 firm-year observations, we identify 520 (36.41%)derivatives usage observations. This ratio is lower than
developed countries derivatives usage levels. When we review
hedging purposes, we identify 32.98%, 13.59% and 3.29% for
currency risk, interest rate risk and commodity price risk
hedgers respectively. Table 1 Panel B shows hedgers and
nonhedgers by industry classification.3.1. Dependent variablesIn our empirical models, dependent variable is the firm
value and we measure the firm value by using Tobin's Q ratio.
As emphasized by Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988),
Tobin's Q ratio is a good proxy for firm value measurement. In
empirical studies, an approximation of Tobin's Q ratio is
generally used. In this study, Tobin's Q ratio is defined as
[(Market value of equity þ Preferred stocks þ Total debts)/
Total assets]. Chung and Pruitt (1994) introduced this widely
used robust approximation of Tobin's Q ratio. Allayannis and
Weston (2001), Jin and Jorion (2006) and Panaretou (2013)
also used the same definition. We use the natural logarithm
transformation of Tobin's Q ratio since log-transformed Tobin's
Q ratios have better statistical distribution properties than raw
Tobin's Q ratios as suggested by Hirsch and Seaks (1993).
Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988) claim that the industry
in which a firm operates may be an important factor to
determine Tobin's Q ratio of the firm. Depending on this view
and following Panaretou (2013), we also use industry adjusted
Tobin's Q ratios to control industry effects on the firm value.
Industry adjusted Tobin's Q ratio is calculated as the difference
between natural logarithm of firm's Q ratio and industry me-
dian of log-transformed Tobin's Q ratio.
Table 2 Panel A reports descriptive statistics of dependent
variables in our sample. Tobin's Q ratio has mean value of
1.36, median of 1.14 and standard deviation of 0.76 and it is
skewed.3.2. Independent variablesWe use three different measures for use of financial de-
rivatives: (a) Derivatives Use is a dummy variable that equals
to 1 if a firm uses any kind of derivative instruments and
0 otherwise. (b) Extent of Hedging is a continuous variable
that is measured as ratio of total notional value of derivative
instruments to book value of total assets. (c) Hedging Ac-
counting based Derivatives Use is a dummy variable that
equals to 1 if the firm reports any of the financial derivatives
accounts in the statement of financial position at any quarter
within a year, 0 otherwise.
We collected the data of derivatives use (hedging activity)
from the annual reports. At the end of our data collection
process, we constructed a unique data set for the use of
financial derivatives in Turkish non-financial firms. Following
Nelson, Moffitt, and Affleck-Graves (2005) and Panaretou
(2013), specifically we accept exchange rate forwards, cur-
rency swaps and currency options as currency derivatives;
interest rate swaps, caps, collars and other options as interest
rate derivatives; commodity price forwards and options as
Table 1
Hedgers by year and industry.
N All derivatives (%) Currency derivatives (%) Interest rate derivatives (%) Commodity derivatives (%)
Panel A: firms by year
2007 204 24.51 21.57 8.82 2.94
2008 204 39.71 36.27 13.73 3.92
2009 204 39.22 36.76 15.69 2.45
2010 204 39.22 35.29 14.22 3.43
2011 204 37.25 33.33 15.2 3.43
2012 204 38.24 33.82 13.73 3.92
2013 204 36.76 33.82 13.73 2.94
Total 1428 36.41 32.98 13.59 3.29
Panel B: firms by industry
Applied resources 98 14.29 14.29 6.12 0.00
Automobiles & auto parts 63 50.79 39.68 23.81 0.00
Chemicals 91 40.66 38.46 18.68 0.00
Cyclical consumer products 273 29.67 27.11 4.76 3.30
Cyclical consumer services 98 22.45 21.43 13.27 0.00
Energy-fossil fuels 42 47.62 33.33 21.43 30.95
Food & beverages 147 44.90 33.33 26.53 4.76
Food & drug retailing 21 42.86 42.86 23.81 0.00
Industrial & commercial serv. 56 28.57 28.57 5.36 0.00
Industrial goods 105 48.57 45.71 0.95 7.62
Mineral resources 175 29.71 29.14 6.86 0.00
Personal & household prod. 14 100.00 100.00 42.86 0.00
Real estate 42 11.90 9.52 7.14 0.00
Retailers 42 38.10 38.10 16.67 0.00
Software & IT services 14 14.29 14.29 0.00 0.00
Technology equipment 63 49.21 49.21 0.00 0.00
Telecommunications serv. 7 100.00 100.00 42.86 0.00
Transportation 42 50.00 50.00 47.62 16.67
Utilities 35 68.57 57.14 62.86 8.57
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footnotes of financial statements for text strings of “deriva-
tive”, “hedge”, “forward”, “swap”, “option”, “futures” and
“financial risk”. If we found any searched term in the foot-
notes, careful reading was done to confirm that the firm uses
derivative instruments. We use the net position of each type of
risk in this study.
As an alternative measure, we also collected data of
Hedging Accounting based Derivatives Use dummy variable
from quarterly financial statements. We examined the values
of quarterly reported derivatives accounts in balance sheets
and income statements. These accounts are current derivative
assets, noncurrent derivative assets, current derivative liabil-
ities, noncurrent derivative liabilities, unrealised valuation
gain/loss on hedging derivatives equity account and compre-
hensive income e hedging gain/loss. If any of these accounts
has a value in any quarterly financial statement within a year,
this means that examined firm uses a financial derivative in-
strument during relevant fiscal year. Because of differences in
data collection process, percentage of hedgers based on
hedging accounts is lower than that of our hand-collected
derivatives use. The main difference of using quarterly hedg-
ing accounts as proxy for derivatives use is that we can detect
interim use of financial derivatives without reading footnotes.
In other words, if a firm reports changes in fair value of
financial derivatives as asset, liability or equity in its interim
financial statements, then this firm is accepted as hedger.However, if a company does not hold any financial derivatives
position at the end of quarterly reporting period, there is no
need to use a hedging account in financial statements. Hence,
we cannot detect any derivatives use of such company, if this
company has closed its positions before quarterly reporting
period. On the other hand, reading year-end financial reports
enables us to pick derivatives use information from footnotes
even if companies have no open derivative positions at the date
of financial reporting. In other words, if a firm declares use of
financial derivatives as risk management tool in footnotes of
financial statements, we accept this firm as hedger in our hand-
collected data set.
Table 2 Panel B presents descriptive statistics of derivatives
use variables. In addition to derivatives use independent var-
iables, we use several control variables that can explain firm
value based on the existing literature. These control variables
are listed below:
Firm size: Firm size variable is the natural logarithm of
total assets adjusted for inflation.
Profitability: This variable is calculated as net profit divided
by total assets (return on assets, ROA).
Leverage: This variable is defined as long-term debts
divided by market value of total shareholders' equity.
Investment growth (opportunities): Future investment op-
portunities affect firm value. Following Yermack (1996)
and Allayannis and Weston (2001), we calculated a
Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
N Mean Median Std. Dev. P1 P99
Panel A: descriptive statistics of Tobin's Q ratios
All firms
Tobin's Q ratio 1428 1.36 1.14 0.76 0.54 4.72
ln Tobin's Q ratio 1428 0.20 0.13 0.42 0.62 1.55
Industry adjusted Tobin's Q ratio 1428 0.06 0.01 0.39 0.70 1.41
Non-hedgers
Tobin's Q ratio 908 1.42 1.14 0.88 0.54 5.38
ln Tobin's Q ratio 908 0.22 0.13 0.46 0.63 1.68
Industry adjusted Tobin's Q ratio 908 0.07 0.01 0.43 0.74 1.55
Hedgers
Tobin's Q ratio 520 1.26 1.13 0.50 0.57 3.16
ln Tobin's Q ratio 520 0.17 0.12 0.34 0.57 1.15
Industry adjusted Tobin's Q ratio 520 0.04 0.01 0.32 0.62 0.95
Panel B: descriptive statistics of derivatives use
General derivatives use dummy 1428 0.36 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00
Extent of general derivatives 1365 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.52
General derivatives use dummy (Hedging accounts) 1428 0.22 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00
Panel C: non-hedgers
Total assets (million TRY) 908 555.21 218.15 1278.41 10.83 4492.88
Sales (million TRY) 908 419.51 110.41 1641.16 0.13 5028.77
MV of equity (million TRY) 908 366.08 87.03 996.29 5.05 4076.88
Long term debt (million TRY) 908 44.13 1.42 188.74 0.00 700.00
BV of equity (million TRY) 908 215.20 75.96 457.57 92.84 1707.51
ROA 908 0.018 0.022 0.180 0.477 0.361
Dividend dummy 908 0.319 0.000 0.466 0.000 1.000
LT debt/equity 908 0.233 0.021 0.751 0.000 3.181
Capex/sales 908 0.089 0.034 0.203 0.013 0.983
Foreign sales/sales 908 0.173 0.070 0.222 0.000 0.876
Diversification dummy 908 0.222 0.000 0.416 0.000 1.000
Currency position/total assets 908 0.203 0.089 0.576 0.000 1.193
Cash/current liabilities 908 0.851 0.118 4.178 0.000 13.193
Panel D: Hedgers
Total assets (million TRY) 520 2835.48 776.81 4490.96 41.22 20,075.79
Sales (million TRY) 520 2382.82 651.27 4705.34 11.58 22,527.95
MV of equity (million TRY) 520 1708.03 379.72 3684.59 8.68 19,536.00
Long term debt (million TRY) 520 395.14 61.52 870.70 0.00 3328.73
BV of equity (million TRY) 520 993.51 297.69 1878.45 3.20 9571.65
ROA 520 0.024 0.033 0.098 0.284 0.233
Dividend dummy 520 0.490 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000
LT debt/equity 520 0.350 0.149 0.585 0.000 3.135
Capex/sales 520 0.067 0.034 0.120 0.000 0.635
Foreign sales/sales 520 0.245 0.167 0.242 0.000 0.835
Diversification dummy 520 0.412 0.000 0.493 0.000 1.000
Currency position/total assets 520 0.165 0.125 0.151 0.001 0.585
Cash/current liabilities 520 0.771 0.162 7.173 0.001 10.090
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divided by sales.
Access to financial markets: This dummy variable is 1 if the
firm pays dividend during the fiscal year, 0 otherwise. If a
firm is able to pay dividend, it is less likely to be capital
constrained.
Industrial Diversification: This dummy variable is 1 if the
firm operates more than one product segments, 0 otherwise.
We used Thomson Reuters Business Classification's busi-
ness sector codes to create our industry diversification
control variable.
Geographic Diversification: The ratio of foreign sales to
total sales is a proxy for geographic diversification.Currency Position: Currency position gap as reported in
financial reports is an indicator of ex-ante foreign currency
risk. This gap can be positive or negative, but in either case
currency position gap causes currency risk. Therefore, we
calculate currency position variable as absolute currency
position that is monetary amount divided by total assets.
Liquidity: Liquidity is measured with ratio of cash and cash
equivalents to current liabilities.
Industry Effect: A firm may have a higher market value
because of the industry in which the firm operates. We use
both industry adjusted Tobin's Q ratios and industry
dummies.
Table 2 Panel C and Panel D show descriptive statistics of
control variables. As reported in Table 2 Panel D, hedgers are
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firms compared to non-hedgers. Hedgers also have higher
foreign sales/sales ratio and currency position/total assets
ratio; they are more likely to pay dividend. On the other hand,
hedgers have lower capital expenditures/sales ratio (growth
opportunities).
We initially compare hedgers and non-hedgers in terms of
firm value (Tobin's Q ratio) and several control variables by
using two sample t-test of mean values. Table 3 reports dif-
ferences in mean and related t statistics for several variables.
Hedgers have lower Tobin's Q ratio (firm value) and capital
expenditures/sales ratio in comparison to non-hedgers, while
they have higher total assets, market value, foreign sales/net
sales, financial leverage, dividend payment propensity, diver-
sification in their operations in comparison to nen-hedgers.
The difference between Tobin's Q ratios of hedger and non-
hedgers is 0.15 and it is statistically significant at 5%
level. This finding is a sign of hedging discount, but it is
important to emphasize that we can not control effects of other
determinants of firm value in univariate analysis.
We report correlation coefficients between independent
variables in Table 4. Correlation coefficients are relatively low
implying that possibility of facing multicollinearity problem is
low.
4. Analysis and results4.1. Tobin's Q analysisSimilar to recent studies of Allayannis and Weston (2001),
Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006), Allayannis, Lel, and
Miller (2012) and Panaretou (2013), we have used multivar-
iate models to investigate the direct effect of derivatives use on
firm value. In multivariate structure, we estimated the models
below to investigate value relevance of derivatives use.
yit ¼ aþ bDerivatives Useit þ dX0itþ uit: ð1Þ
yit ¼ aþ bExtent of Hedgingit þ dX0it þ uit: ð2ÞTable 3
Comparison of hedgers and non-hedgers.
Hedgers Non-hedgers Difference t-statistic
Tobin's Q 1.26 1.42 0.15*** 4.20
Total assets 2835 555 2280*** 11.32
Market value of equity 1708 366 1342*** 8.14
Foreign sales/net sales 0.24 0.17 0.07*** 5.57
LT debt/equity ratio 0.35 0.23 0.12*** 3.28
ROA 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.76
Dividend dummy 0.49 0.32 0.17*** 6.37
Cap. exp./sales 0.07 0.09 0.02** 2.54
Cash & cash equ./current
liabilities
0.77 0.85 0.08 0.23
Diversification Dummy 0.41 0.22 0.19*** 7.37
N 520 908
***, **, and * indicates statistically significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.yit is firm value (natural logarithm of Tobin's Q ratio or in-
dustry adjusted Tobin's Q ratio), a is the intercept term, De-
rivatives Use is our dummy variable to measure derivatives
use, X'it is vector of all control variables that we explained
earlier and uit is error terms. However, a dummy variable does
not measure the exact level of hedging. In order to distinguish
the value effect of being fully hedger or partially hedger, we
use a continuous variable for derivatives use and estimate
model 2. Extent of Hedging is our continuous variable to
measure extent of hedging.
First, we used panel data with fixed effects method to es-
timate our models in Equations (1) and (2). In order to control
for possible endogeneity concerns, we also used dynamic
panel with system GMM estimators in estimation of model 2.
Table 5 indicates regression results for all hedgers
including currency risk, interest rate risk and commodity
price risk hedgers. Following studies in the literature, we
estimate fixed effects panel data model with time dummies
for Ln Tobin's Q ratio and industry adjusted Tobin's Q ratio
as dependent variables and derivatives use and extent of
hedging as independent variables. The number of observa-
tions for extent of hedging (1365) is lower than observations
of derivatives use dummy variable (1428). Because some
firms do not report notional values of derivatives although
they use derivatives as a risk management instrument. If a
firm does not report notional value of its derivative in-
struments, we accept this observation as missing data in our
analysis.
Our preliminary results for multivariate analysis present
weak evidence of hedging premium for Turkish non-financial
hedgers. Coefficients of derivatives use dummy variable are
positive in models 1 and 3, but they are not statistically sig-
nificant. These results can be misleading, because derivatives
use dummy variable does not measure exact level of hedging.
To solve this issue, we also use a continuous variable of extent
of hedging. Coefficients of extent of hedging variable are
positive and higher in models 2 and 4, which means that there
is a positive relationship between firm value and hedging. In
other words, hedgers have higher firm values than non-
hedgers. The coefficients are 7.11% and 13.36%. However,
only the coefficient of model 4 is statistically significant at
10% level indicating weak evidence of hedging premium for
Turkish non-financial hedgers during the sample period. In
other words, there is only weak evidence for the value rele-
vance of derivatives use. When we consider the results of
model 4, the coefficient for extent of hedging variable is
0.1336 and it is statistically significant at 10% level.
Depending on this coefficient, one unit increase in extent of
hedging variable increases industry adjusted Tobin's Q ratio by
14.29% (e0.1336*1e1). Following Panaretou's (2013) calcula-
tion method, we can also calculate magnitude of hedging
premium. Because mean of extent of hedging variable is
0.0304, an average hedger firm in our sample has a value
premium of 0.41% (e0.1336*0.0304e1). As risk management
theory suggests, the use of financial derivatives as risk man-
agement instrument is value relevant. Our results imply that
non-financial companies can increase their value by hedging
Table 4
Pearson correlation coefficients among independent variables.
Ln total assets Foreign sales/sales Leverage ROA Dividend Capex/sales Research Diversif. Currency Cash ratio
Ln total assets
Foreign sales/sales 0.14
Leverage 0.20 0.03
ROA 0.26 0.12 0.19
Dividend 0.43 0.06 0.12 0.34
Capex/sales 0.16 0.09 0.25 0.03 0.01
Research exp./sales 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02
Diversification 0.40 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.04
Currency position 0.13 0.04 0.13 0.21 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.08
Cash ratio 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.04
General derivatives use 0.46 0.18 0.17 0.07 0.20 0.03 0.07 0.18 0.03 0.07
Extent of general derivatives 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.07 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.05
Currency derivatives use 0.39 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.16 0.03 0.07 0.21 0.03 0.07
Extent of currency derivatives 0.12 0.26 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.04
Interest rate derivatives use 0.43 0.01 0.31 0.03 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.04
Extent of interest rate derivatives 0.14 0.05 0.43 0.06 0.05 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.03
Commodity derivatives use 0.28 0.18 0.09 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.16 0.00 0.02
Extent of commodity derivatives 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01
General derivatives use 0.52 0.15 0.21 0.06 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.23 0.03 0.02
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very low compared to findings of Allayannis and Weston
(2001) for the US data (5%) and Panaretou (2013) for the
UK data (6%).Table 5
General derivatives use and firm value regression results.
Dependent variable Ln Tobin's Q Ln Tobin's Q
Models (1) (2)
Independent variables
Derivatives use 0.0334
(1.15)
Extent of Hedging 0.0711
(1.17)
Ln total assets 0.1901*** 0.1890***
(4.39) (4.26)
ROA 0.0896 0.0886
(0.96) (0.91)
Dividend dummy 0.0397* 0.0348
(1.78) (1.48)
Leverage 0.0084 0.0016
(0.61) (0.12)
Cap. exp./sales 0.0065 0.0041
(0.10) (0.06)
Diversification 0.0534 0.0540
(1.24) (1.21)
Foreign sales/sales 0.0642 0.0564
(0.70) (0.51)
Currency position 0.0247 0.0246
(1.09) (1.11)
Liquidity 0.0011 0.0014
(0.68) (0.83)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies No No
Intercept 1.3420*** 1.3460***
(5.33) (5.21)
R2 33.71% 32.42%
N 1428 1365
***, **, and * indicates statistically significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respect
and autocorrelation. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Models are estimatedOur results also indicate that some control variables can
explain firm value. Firm size is negatively related to firm value
and coefficients are statistically significant in all models. Divi-
dend dummy variable hasa statistically significant positive co-
efficient and it implies that easy access to financial marketsIndustry adjusted Tobin's Q Industry adjusted Tobin's Q
(3) (4)
0.0412
(1.41)
0.1336*
(1.73)
0.1791*** 0.1753***
(4.56) (4.34)
0.0957 0.0975
(1.36) (1.32)
0.0311 0.0314
(1.43) (1.35)
0.0133 0.0089
(1.09) (0.67)
0.0077 0.0145
(0.14) (0.25)
0.0396 0.0377
(0.90) (0.82)
0.0566 0.0450
(0.57) (0.39)
0.0121 0.0122
(0.58) (0.60)
0.0007 0.0003
(0.80) (0.35)
Yes Yes
No No
1.0524*** 1.0411***
(4.59) (4.43)
7.83% 7.53%
1428 1365
ively. We use firm level clustered robust standard errors for heteroskedasticity
by using fixed-effects panel data regression.
Table 8
Extent of hedging and firm value results with system GMM dynamic model.
Panel A: dependent variable Ln Tobin's Q Industry adjusted Tobin's Q
Models (1) (2)
Lagged dependent variable
(Yt-1)
0.7001*** 0.7016***
(14.69) (16.04)
Extent of Hedging 0.1740*** 0.2059***
(2.76) (3.30)
Table 6
Currency, interest rate and commodity derivatives use and firm value regres-
sion results.
Dependent variable Currency
Hedging
Interest rate
Hedging
Commodity
Hedging
Ln Tobin's Q Ln Tobin's Q Ln Tobin's Q
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent variables
derivatives use 0.0238 0.0447 0.0218
(0.88) (1.38) (0.37)
Extent of Hedging 0.1369 0.0438 3.0841**
(1.21) (0.49) (2.16)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 1.34*** 1.34*** 1.33*** 1.33*** 1.33*** 1.34***
(5.33) (5.20) (5.30) (5.26) (5.32) (5.34)
R2 33.66% 32.66% 33.70% 32.96% 33.62% 33.56%
N 1428 1376 1428 1401 1428 1418
***, **, and * indicates statistically significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively. We use firm level clustered robust standard errors for hetero-
skedasticity and autocorrelation. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Models are estimated by using fixed-effects panel data regression.
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are statistically insignificant.
Next, we investigate the value relevance of currency, in-
terest rate and commodity derivatives use separately. As we
have stated earlier, most of the hedgers are currency hedgers in
our sample, therefore we expect to find similar results for
currency hedging as we have found for general derivatives use
in the preceding section. Following the same methodology, we
estimate fixed effects panel data model with time dummies for
Ln Tobin's Q ratio as dependent variable and curreny, interest
rate and commodity derivatives use as independent variables.
Table 6 presents analysis results for currency, interest rate and
commodity price risk hedging. The results for currency and
interest rate hedging (models 1e4) are very similar to the
results of general hedging, showing no statistically significant
relationship between firm value and hedging. However, we
identified a positive and statistically significant relationship
between firm value and the extent of commodity price risk
hedging in model 6.Table 7
General derivatives use and firm value regression results (with alternative
variable).
Dependent variable Ln Tobin's Q Industry adjusted Tobin's Q
Models (1) (2)
Derivatives use 0.0012 0.0122
(0.04) (0.42)
Control variables Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Intercept 1.33*** 1.04***
(5.32) (4.56)
R2 33.61% 7.65%
N 1428 1428
***, **, and * indicates statistically significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively. We use firm level clustered robust standard errors for hetero-
skedasticity and autocorrelation. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Models are estimated by using fixed-effects panel data regression.Table 7 reports the results for general hedging measured
with alternative hedging accounting dummy variable. Similar
to our previous estimations, we have used fixed effects panel
data model and included all same control variables. We do not
identify any evidence of hedging premium or discount for
Turkish non-financial hedgers by using our alternative de-
rivatives use dummy variable.
We use further econometric methods to check robustness of
our results against endogeneity concerns documented in the
literature. To control for endogeneity problem, we employ
dynamic panel with system GMM estimators as suggested by
Magee (2009).
Endogeneity concerns are serious and this problem can
affect interpretation of our results. For example, Jin and Jorion
(2006:894) discuss possible endogeneity between firm value
and hedging. They suggest that selecting firms within the same
industry solves endogeneity problem. Bartram et al. (2011)
also emphasize how important endogeneity issues are to
investigate value relevance of derivatives use. Magee (2009:2)
defines two possible sources of endogeneity as reverse cau-
sality and unobserved heterogeneity. Studies on value rele-
vance of hedging accept derivatives use as independent
variable, while other studies that examines determinants of
hedging find that higher market value is a significant factor to
determine propensity to hedge. In addition, some firm char-
acteristics can affect both firm value and derivatives use
(Allayannis et al., 2012:70). In other words, an omitted vari-
able may affect both firm value and derivatives use. Similarly,
by definition some omitted factors may affect total assets,
return on assets and financial leverage and firm value. In theseControl variables Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes No
Intercept 0.2871** 0.2604***
(2.49) (2.74)
N 1172 1172
Panel B: diagnostic test results
Number of groups 204 204
Number of instruments 154 154
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1)
statistic
5.4*** 6.1***
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2)
statistic
0.1 0.5
Hansen's test statistic 135.7 129.5
***, **, and * indicates statistically significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively. We use firm level clustered robust standard errors for hetero-
skedasticity and autocorrelation. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Models are estimated by using dynamic panel data regression with system
GMM estimators.
Table 9
Results Fama-French three-factor time-series model.
Dependent variable RHedger,t RNon-hedger,t
a (Alpha Coefficient) 0.0023
(0.99)
b1 (Excess Market Index
Return)
0.0329
(1.28)
b2 (SMB) 0.4759***
(5.08)
b3 (HML) 0.0651
(0.99)
F Statistics 15.11***
R2 39.18%
N 84
***, **, and * indicates statistically significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively. We use robust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Models are estimated by
using OLS regression.
117Y. Ayturk et al. / Borsa _Istanbul Review 16-2 (2016) 108e120situations, independent variables can be correlated with error
terms in regression models.
As suggested by Magee (2009), if firm value is correlated
with its lagged values, we can use a dynamic model with
system GMM estimators. Lagged dependent variable as an
independent variable (dynamic model structure) considers a
possible autoregressive feature of the data. System GMM es-
timators were developed by Arellano and Bond (1991),
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
This model is suitable for small T and large N panels
(Roodman, 2006). System GMM estimators of Blundell and
Bond (1998) employ a first-difference transformation and
use lagged values of endogenous variables in first differences
equation.
In our dynamic models with system GMM estimators, we
accept first lag of dependent variable (natural logarithm of
Tobin's Q ratio or industry adjusted Tobin's Q ratio), extent of
hedging variable, natural logarithm of total assets, return on
assets and financial leverage ratio as endogenous, while all
other variables are accepted as exogenous.
Table 8 reports the results of dynamic models with system
GMM estimators. Similar to our previous findings, coefficients
of the extent of hedging are positive, but there is a consider-
able improvement in statistical significance of coefficents.
They are stastistically significant at 1% level. These results
strengthen our previous findings on the presence of hedging
premium for Turkish non-financial firms. We identify that
derivatives use increases firm value of Turkish non-financial
firms.
The coefficients of the extent of hedging variable are
17.40% and 20.59% in models 1 and 2 respectively. When we
consider the results of model 1, the coefficient of the extent of
hedging variable is 0.1740 and it is statistically significant at
1% level. Depending on this coefficient, one unit increase in
the extent of hedging variable increases Tobin's Q ratio by
19.01% (e0.1740*1e1). Following Panaretou's (2013) calcula-
tion method, we can also calculate magnitude of hedging
premium. Since the mean value of the extent of hedging is
0.0304, an average hedger firm in our sample has a value
premium of 0.53% (e0.1740*0.0304e1). This hedging premium is
very low compared to the findings of Allayannis and Weston
(2001) for the US data (5%) and Panaretou (2013) for the
UK data (6%). In addition, the extent of hedging also increases
industry adjusted Tobin's Q ratios of Turkish non-financial
firms. The results of diagnostic tests are reported at Table 8
Panel B and they are satisfactory for validity of system
GMM dynamic model. Our results of dynamic model also
indicates that non-financial hedgers are rewarded with higher
firm values by the market.4.2. Fama-French three-factor time-series analysisIn addition to panel data analysis presented in the pre-
ceeding subsection, we use portfolio formation methodology
with Fama-French three-factor model to examine the rela-
tionship between firm value and hedging by comparing stock
performance of hedgers and non-hedgers. Following Phanet al. (2014), we construct a portfolio in which stocks of
hedgers are longed and stocks of non-hedgers are shorted and
investigate whether this portfolio generates a positive alpha or
not. Phan et al. (2014) assert that alpha coefficient is superior
measure of firm value in comparison to Tobin's Q. Similar to
Phan et al. (2014), we use the following model:
RHedger;t RNonhedger;t ¼ aþ b1ðRM;t RF;tÞ þ b2SMBt
þ b3HMLt þ uit: ð3Þ
RHedger,t is equal weighted monthly portfolio return of hedgers
at month t and RNon-hedger,t is equal weighted monthly portfolio
return of non-hedgers at month t. RM,t is monthly return of
market index and RF,t is monthly risk free rate of return. SMBt
is monthly return difference between the portfolio of small
stocks and the portfolio of big stocks. HMLt is monthly return
difference between the portfolio of stocks with high book-to-
market value ratio and the portfolio of stocks with low
book-to-market value ratio. A statistically significant positive
alpha coefficient means hedging premium. On the other hand,
a negative alpha coefficient indicates hedging discount.
The results of Fama-French time-series analysis are re-
ported in Table 9. Alpha coefficient indicates value of
corporate derivative use as it is the difference between returns
of two portfolios (hedgers and nonhedgers). Although sign of
alpha coefficient is positive, it is not statistically different from
zero at 5% significance level. In other words, hedging with
financial derivatives cannot create positive alpha in Turkish
stock market over the period of 2007e2013. This result is
consistent with our previous findings of fixed-effects panel
data model documenting no hedging premium or discount for
Turkish non-financial firms.4.3. Single sector analysisIn this section, we analyse one specific industry to in-
crease robustness of our general results reported in the
Table 10
Currency derivatives and firm value regression results for food and beverages
industry.
Dependent Variable Ln Tobin's Q Ln Tobin's Q
Models (1) (2)
Independent variables
Currency derivatives use 0.1297*
(-1.90)
Extent of currency Hedging 0.4763
(-0.77)
Ln total assets 0.1639 0.1547
(-1.48) -(1.46)
ROA 0.2714 0.2535
-(0.87) (-0.76)
Dividend dummy 0.1248** 0.1265**
(2.15) (2.55)
Leverage 0.0105 0.0027
(0.14) (-0.04)
Cap. exp./sales 0.6064* 0.6476**
(1.89) (2.50)
Foreign sales/sales 0.0944 0.1766
(0.33) (0.44)
Liquidity 0.1947 0.1959
(1.62) (1.61)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Intercept 1.2222* 1.1238*
(1.96) (1.84)
R2 45.60% 43.00%
N 168 168
***, **, and * indicates statistically significant levels of 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively. We use firm level clustered robust standard errors for hetero-
skedasticity and autocorrelation. t-Statistics are reported in parentheses.
Models are estimated by using fixed-effects panel data regression.
Table 11
Currency derivatives and firm value regression results for food and
beverages industry.
Dependent variable Ln Tobin's Q
Panel A: estimation results of Equation 4
Currency derivatives use * Dd 0.0751
(1.21)
Currency derivatives use * (1
e Dd)
0.0961
(1.40)
Dd 0.2535**
(2.49)
Control variables Yes
Year dummies Yes
Intercept 0.0294
(0.23)
R2 32.33%
N 168
Panel B: Estimation Results of Equation 5
Currency Derivatives Use *
RTL
0.2396
(0.87)
RTL 0.6032**
(2.03)
Control variables Yes
Year dummies Yes
Intercept 0.1118
(0.92)
R2 31.57%
N 168
***, **, and * indicates statistically significant levels of 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively. We use firm level clustered robust standard errors
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. Models are estimated by using Pooled OLS regression.
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neity problems might appear as a result of using sample firms
from different industries. Food and beverages is the industry
of our choice for several reasons. The number of firms
operating in food and beverage industry is high among in-
dustries in our sample (24 firms with 168 firm-year obser-
vations). Most companies in this industry have foreign
currency position gaps over the sample period. Homogeneity
among firms in this industry is strong to analyse effects of
hedging on firm value.
Firstly, we estimate Equations (1) and (2) based on Tobin's
Q analysis for this specific industry, food and beverages, by
using fixed effects panel data model. Table 10 presents the
results that show no statistically significant (at 5% level)
relationship between currency hedging and firm value. These
results are consistent with our preliminary results reported in
Table 5 for our full sample. These results also state that cur-
rency hedging is value irrelevant for food and beverage
companies in Turkey.
Following Phan et al. (2014), we also examine effects of
local currency (underlying asset) depreciation or appreciation
on the relationship between currency hedging and firm value.
We expect that Turkish lira depreciation against foreign cur-
rency (mainly US dollar and Euro) has negative effect on firm
value because most Turkish food and beverage firms have
foreign currency position gaps. Hedging foreign exchange
risks during the periods of Turkish lira deprecation shouldenhance firm value, whereas hedging during the periods of
Turkish lira appreciation should lower firm value. To test this
reasoning, firstly we calculate annual depreciation or appre-
ciation rates for local currency, Turkish lira, against the US
dollar and Euro and then take average to construct RTL
continuous variable which is positive when Turkish lira de-
preciates against US dollar and Euro during a particular year,
negative otherwise. We also construct depreciation dummy
variable (Dd) that is 1 if RTL is positive for a particular year,
0 otherwise. Following Phan et al. (2014) we use two alter-
native models stated below to examine effects of local cur-
rency apprecation or depreciation on firm value.
yit ¼ aþ b1Derivatives UseitDdþ b2Derivatives Useit
 ð1DdÞ þ b3 Ddþ dX0it þ uit:
ð4Þ
yit ¼ aþ b1Derivatives UseitRTLþb2RTLþ dX0it
þ uit:
ð5Þ
In Equation (4), we expect that b1 will have a positive
value, but b2 will have a negative sign because hedging is
expected to enhance (reduce) value when Turkish Lira de-
preciates (appreciates) against US dollar and Euro. In Equa-
tion (5), we use a continuous variable (RTL) and its interaction
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ship between firm value and degree of depreciation/apprecia-
tion in Turkish Lira.
Table 11 indicates effects of change in value of Turkish Lira
on the relationship between currency hedging and firm value.
In Table 11 Panel A, the sign of dummy variable Dd's coeffi-
cient (0.2535) is negative showing that depreciation of
Turkish Lira has statisticaly significant negative effect on firm
value for Turkish food and beverage firms. More importantly,
we document that hedging does not affect firm value during
both Turkish Lira appreciation period and depreciation period.
Insignificant coefficients of interacted terms support our pre-
vious findings that corporate derivatives use are not associated
with higher or lower firm value. Table 11 Panel B shows
estimation results of the model with continuous variable, RTL,
which measures changes in value of Turkish Lira currency.
Similar to Panel A, we find that firm value is significantly
affected by depreciation in Turkish Lira (coefficient of
0.6032). Interacted term between corporate derivative use
and movement of Turkish Lira does not have statistically
significant effect on firm value. This result strengthens our
previous findings on value irrelvance of hedging.
5. Conclusions
In this study, we have investigated the relationship be-
tween derivatives use and firm value for Turkish non-
financial firms during the period of 2007e2013. We intro-
duced characteristics of hedgers and the extent of hedging as
a first time in Turkey. Only 36.41% of the companies in the
sample use financial derivatives to hedge their currency, in-
terest rate or commodity price risks. We have used Tobin's Q
ratio analysis with panel data model, Fama-French three-
factor time-series analysis and single sector analysis to
investigate whether corporate derivatives use is value relevant
or not. Except Tobin's Q ratio analysis with system GMM
estimators, we can not find significant hedging premium or
discount for all Turkish non-financial firms. By using Tobin's
Q ratio analysis with system GMM estimators, we find a
positive relationship between derivatives use and firm value;
hedging premium is 0.53% for an average Turkish non-
financial firms. However, level of hedging activity (36.41%)
and level of hedging premium (0.53%) is very low compared
to findings in developed countries. We also test the effects of
currency hedging, interest rate hedging and commodity price
hedging separately. We find similar results as in the case of
general derivatives use. Overall, majority of our results imply
that use of financial derivatives does not affect firm value in
Turkish market.
There are several possible reasons for our finding of limited
or no hedging premium in Turkish case. As Guay and Kothari
(2003) question, derivatives use is not the only way to manage
corporate risk. There may be other risk management tools
conducted by Turkish non-financial firms. Operational hedg-
ing and natural hedging are two possible alternative risk
management tools that can be used instead of derivatives use.
The second explanation is related with the disclosure qualityof derivatives use. As we discussed earlier, low reporting
quality of derivatives use leads to information asymmetry
between owners, managers and investors. We identify that
most companies report limited information on their derivatives
use in Turkey. Therefore, for an average investor, it is very
hard to read risk management policies and hedging strategies
from financial reports and use this information during invest-
ment decision process. Investors may not reward hedging with
higher market values (or they reward derivatives use up to a
limited point) because they do not understand hedging policies
of Turkish non-financial firms. Another possible explanation
for no hedging premium is related with ownership structure of
Turkish non-financial firms. Ownership concentration is very
high among Turkish publicly held firms and investor protec-
tion systems are also weak. As Khediri (2010) explains, in-
vestors may not value hedging policies of Turkish firms fairly
because investors think that insider blockholders may be risk
averse or have other motives to use derivatives rather than risk
management and value maximization.
We could not consider effects of operational hedging and
natural hedging due to data unavailability. In future research,
in addition to derivatives use, operational hedging and natural
hedging should be considered in search for value relevance of
hedging. Lastly, authorities in Turkey should improve report-
ing quality of derivatives and companies must be encouraged
to disclose detailed derivatives use information.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the financial sup-
port of The Scientific and Technological Research Council of
Turkey (TUBITAK) through 2214/A research grant
programme.
References
Allayannis, G., Lel, U., & Miller, D. P. (2012). The use of foreign currency
derivatives, corporate governance, and firm value around. Journal of In-
ternational Economics, 87(1), 65e79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.
2011.12.003.
Allayannis, G., & Weston, J. P. (2001). The use of foreign currency derivatives
and firm market value. The Review of Financial Studies, 14(1), 243e276.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/14.1.243.
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some tests of specification for panel data:
Monter Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Re-
view of Economic Studies, 58(2), 277e297. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/
2297968.
Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995). Another look at the instrumental variables
estimation of error-components models. Journal of Econometrics, 68(1),
29e51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(94)01642-D.
Aretz, K., & Bartram, S. M. (2010). Corporate hedging and shareholder value.
The Journal of Financial Research, 33(4), 317e371. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1111/j.1475-6803.2010.01278.x.
Bartram, S. M., Brown, G. W., & Conrad, J. (2011). The effects of derivatives
on firm risk and value. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
46(4), 967e999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022109011000275.
Belghitar, Y., Clark, E., & Mefteh, S. (2013). Foreign currency derivative use
and shareholder value. International Review of Financial Analysis,
283e293. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2012.02.004.
Berkman, H., & Bradbury, M. E. (1996). Empirical evidence on the corporate
use of derivatives. Financial Management, 25(2), 5e13.
120 Y. Ayturk et al. / Borsa _Istanbul Review 16-2 (2016) 108e120Berrospide, J. M., Purnanandam, A., & Rajan, U. (2008). Corporate hedging,
investment and value. FEDS Working Paper No. 2008-16 http://dx.doi.org/
10.2139/ssrn.1009657.
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment restrictions in
dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econometrics, 87(1), 115e143.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4076(98)00009-8.
Carter, D. A., Rogers, D. A., & Simkins, B. J. (2006). Hedging and value in the
U.S. Airline Industry. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 18(4),
21e33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2006.00107.x.
Chung, K. H., & Pruitt, S. (1994). A simple approximation of Tobin's Q.
Financial Management, 23(3), 70e74.
Dadalt, P., Gay, G. D., & Nam, J. (2002). Asymmetric information and
corporate derivatives use. The Journal of Futures Markets, 22(3),
241e267. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/fut.2216.
Demarzo, P. M., & Duffie, D. (1995). Corporate incentives for hedging and
hedge accounting. The Review of Financial Studies, 8(3), 743e771. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/8.3.743.
Froot, K. A., Scharfstein, D. S., & Stein, J. C. (1993). Risk management:
coordinating corporate investment and financing policies. The Journal of
Finance, 48(5), 1629e1658. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.
tb05123.x.
Guay, W., & Kothari, S. (2003). How much do firms hedge with derivatives?
Journal of Financial Economics, 70(3), 423e461. http://dx.doi.org/10.
1016/S0304-405X(03)00179-X.
Hirsch, B. T., & Seaks, T. G. (1993). Functional form in regression models of
Tobin's Q. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 75(2), 381e385.
Jin, Y., & Jorion, P. (2006). Firm value and hedging: evidence from U.S. Oil
and Gas Producers. The Journal of Finance, 61(2), 893e919. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00858.x.
Khediri, K. B. (2010). Do investors really value derivative use? Empirical
evidence from France. The Journal of Risk Finance, 11(1), 62e74. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1108/15265941011012688.
Leland, H. E. (1998). Agency costs, risk management, and capital structure.
The Journal of Finance, 53(4), 1213e1243. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/
0022-1082.00051.
Lookman, A. (2004). Does hedging increase firm value? Evidence from oil
and gas producing firms. In EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings, Working
Paper (No. 5174).Mackay, P., & Moeller, S. B. (2007). The value of corporate risk management.
The Journal of Finance, 62(3), 1379e1419. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.
1540-6261.2007.01239.x.
Magee, S. (2009). Foreign currency hedging and firm value: A dynamic panel
approach. Working Paper. Macquarie University Department of Applied
Finance and Actuarial Studies http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1150471.
Modigliani, F.,&Miller,M.H. (1958).The cost of capital, corporationfinance and
the theory of investment. The American Economic Review, 48(3), 261e297.
Nelson, J., Moffitt, J., & Affleck-Graves, J. (2005). The impact of hedging on
the market value of equity. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11(5), 851e881.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2005.02.003.
Panaretou, A. (2013). Corporate risk management and firm value: evidence
from the UK market. The European Journal of Finance, 20(12),
1161e1186. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1351847X.2013.766625.
Perez-Gonzalez, F., & Yun, H. (2013). Risk management and firm value: ev-
idence from weather derivatives. Journal of Finance, 68(5), 2143e2176.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12061.
Phan, D., Nguyen, H., & Faff, R. (2014). Uncovering the asymmetric linkage
between financial derivatives and firm value e the case of oil and gas
exploration and production companies. Energy Economics, 45, 340e352.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2014.07.018.
Roodman, D. (2006). How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and
system GMM in Stata, Center for Global Development. Working Paper No.
103 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.982943.
Ross, M. (1996). Corporate hedging: What, why, and how?. Working paper.
Berkeley: University of California.
Smith, C. W., & Stulz, R. M. (1985). The determinants of firms' hedging
policies. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20(4),
391e405. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2330757.
Stulz, R. M. (1996). Rethinking risk management. Journal of Applied
Corporate Finance, 9(3), 8e24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.
1996.tb00295.x.
Wernerfelt, B., & Montgomery, C. A. (1988). Tobin's q and the importance of
focus in firm performance. The American Economic Review, 78(1),
246e250.
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board
of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185e211. http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(95)00844-5.
